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Abstract 
We study impact of the political factors behind allocation of airport infrastructure grants 
under the American Recovery and Reconstruction Act (ARRA) of 2009.  We find that – 
controlling for other factors – airports located in the districts with the larger Obama-
McCain vote differential in November 2008 election received larger ARRA grants.  At 
the same time, the district level election results are poor predictors of whether an airport 
will receive the grant. Senators’ party affiliation and representatives’ membership in the 
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure also appear as factors explaining 
allocation of the ARRA grants to the airports, especially in the State level analysis. 
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1. Introduction 
The federal government plays a crucial role in the infrastructure investment in the United 
States, including allocation of funds to the airports.  As airports are perceived to bring 
substantial benefits to the respective communities, federally funded airport infrastructure 
projects are both sought after, welcomed, and should be beneficial to the politicians 
capable of securing the funds. Complicated structure of the American political system 
creates possibilities for strong influence of political factors on the process of allocation of 
infrastructure investment funds. 
 This study offers the first look at the issue of impact of political factors on the 
aviation infrastructure investment in the USA.  We take advantage of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 (more broadly known as the Stimulus) 
to examine contribution of political factors to allocation of the $1.1 billion worth of the 
airport grants included into the package.  The Stimulus provides an excellent case for 
studying political economy of airport (and more generally, infrastructure) investment, as 
far as involvement of the federal government is concerned.  The law was set up rather 
hastily – Barack Obama was elected President in November of 2008, inaugurated on 
January 20, 2009, and ARRA became law on February 17, 2009.  The criteria for the 
airport infrastructure projects to be funded under the ARRA were rather vague,1 and the 
number of candidate projects clearly exceeded what could have been funded.2  We can 
therefore suspect that the airport infrastructure grants could have been used by the 
Administration, or the Congress as a mechanism to reward districts which brought more 
votes in the latest election.  Additionally, members of the corresponding Congress 
Committees (in particular, of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure) 
might have used ARRA as an opportunity to bring more money to their districts. 
 Examining politics behind the allocation of ARRA funds allows us to take a look 
at the politics behind distribution of the federal funds somewhat outside of the usual 
'repeated game' context. Most of the funds have been distributed directly to the airports 
                                                 
1  ARRA expressed preference for projects that could be completed within two years.  FAA set a 
(technically non-binding) National Priority Rating (NPR) threshold of 62 out of 100 for projects to be 
considered for ARRA grants.  Normal NPR threshold for regular Airport Improvement Program projects is 
40-42 out of 100.  See Section 2 of the paper for more details. 
2  This point is explicitly acknowledged in FAA Stakeholder Guidance, American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, June 9, 2009 
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through a federal agency (Federal Aviation Administration). This is quite different from 
the usual pork barrel scheme, whereby votes are traded in exchange for appropriations for 
the pet projects included directly into the legislation. 
 Our data analysis showed association between the airport’s location in the 
Congressional District with the larger Obama-McCain vote differential in November 
2008 Presidential election, and the amount of the ARRA grant received by the airport. At 
the same time, district level election results are poor predictors of whether the airport 
receives the grant; and estimation results are not entirely robust to taking election results 
from the adjacent districts into consideration. We also detect rather robust evidence of the 
impact of Senate on the grant allocation process. 
 This paper contributes to the literature on public provision of infrastructure.  
Research in this area has been addressing the issues of both effects of the publicly 
provided infrastructure on private sector productivity, and the determinants of the 
infrastructure investment.  The former literature (e.g., Aschauer, 1989; Holz-Eakin, 1994) 
is much richer than the latter. Studies of the determinants of public infrastructure 
investment include Cadot et al. (2006), Castells and Sole-Olle (2005), Kemmerling and 
Stephan (2002, 2008), Fridstrom and Elvik (1997), Bel and Fageda (2009).  All the listed 
papers study infrastructure investment in Europe, and the latter has the most relevance to 
our paper, as it examines (and confirms the existence of) the impact of political factors on 
airport investment in Spain. On the US side, we find a lot of studies asserting the 
disproportionate power of the Senate3 (e.g., Hoover and Pecorino, 2005) and 
Congressional Committees (e.g., Garrett et al., 2006) in allocation of the federal funds 
across the jurisdictions.  Garrett and Sobel (2003) find that states which are politically 
important to the President will have a higher rate of the disaster declaration; the authors 
also find the election year effects on the amounts of the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) disaster payments. The only studies of political determinants of 
transport infrastructure investment in the US are McFadden (1976) – an examination of 
project choices by California Division of Highways, finding limited impact of political 
                                                 
3  The US Congress consists of the House of Representatives and the Senate.  While representation 
in the former is proportional to population; Senate includes two representatives from every State.  The 
literature suggests that less populous states have disproportionate bargaining power under such 
circumstances. 
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determinants on the selection process; as well as Knight (2004), asserting that 
congressmen respond to common pool incentives when voting for transportation projects. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Sections 2 discusses the relevant 
institutional details, including description of the airport infrastructure finance in the USA, 
and an outline of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.  Section 3 
presents the data.  Section 4 outlines the data analysis methodology and reports the 
results, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Institutions 
2.1 Airport Infrastructure Funding in the USA 
Airport infrastructure in the United States is financed via five sources: bonds, State and 
local grants, passenger facility charges, and Airport Improvement Program (AIP) grants.  
This system has been finalized in the early 1990s, when airports have been allowed to 
levy the passenger facility charges. 
 The current regulatory framework US airports operate under is defined by the 
following pieces of legislation.  The Airport and Airways Improvement Act of 1982 
established the present Airport Improvement Program, and mandates that any airport 
accepting AIP grants charge reasonable fees to its aeronautical users. The Final Policy 
Regarding Airport Rates and Charges, issued by the FAA in 1996, establishes that the 
fees charged by the airports to its aeronautical users be cost-based.  Finally, the 1994 
FAA Authorization Act requires that airports be self-sustainable. 
 The AIP is a $3 billion a year program, through which an airport can obtain a 
federal grant for the projects involving land acquisition, as well as construction or 
improvement of the airport infrastructure4.  Grants are available for both publicly owned 
and private designated reliever airports. Note that over eighty percent of the public access 
airports in the United States are publicly owned. Over the last five fiscal years (2005-
2009), more than 1800 airports in the USA have made use of the AIP grants.  An 
important function of the Airport Improvement Program is to ensure cost-based charges 
                                                 
4  AIP funding is limited to improvements related to aircraft operations, typically for planning and 
construction of projects such as; runways, taxiways, aprons, noise abatement, land purchase, as well as 
security, safety, or emergency equipment. 
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for the aeronautical services provided by airports.  An airport suspected of overcharging 
its airline customers risks losing its access to the AIP funds. 
 The distribution system for the AIP grants is complex, and includes a combination 
of the formula and discretionary grants.  Each eligible airport is appropriated a certain 
amount out of the aviation trust fund, based primarily on the volume of aviation services 
provided (formula grants); and can compete for the non-appropriated funds (discretionary 
grants).  The Federal Aviation Administration prioritizes the bids for non-appropriated 
funds according to the National Priority Ranking (NPR).  NPR for each project is 
calculated according to the FAA developed model, which produces values between 0 and 
100, “in accordance with the agency’s goals and objectives”5.  According to the FAA, 
“NPR is used in conjunction with qualitative factors including state and local priorities, 
environmental issues, impact on safety and performance, airport growth, pavement 
condition index, and others”. 
 Since 1992, the commercial service airports (those enplaning more than 2,500 
passengers per year and operating scheduled airline services) have been allowed to 
collect passenger facility charges (PFC).  These charges are added to the airline ticket 
prices, and may not exceed $4.50 per passenger, and $18 per round-trip ticket.  In 2008 
PFC added up to over $2.6 billion.  Passenger facility charges are collected to fund 
federally approved airport infrastructure projects; they do not replace AIP grants. Rather, 
airports apply to FAA for the right to collect PFC for specific projects. Applications are 
typically approved – according to FAA, as of October 1, 2012, PFCs are levied at 385 
airports, and only five applications have been turned down by the agency since the 
inception of the program.  
 Interestingly, the use of PFC is at odds with the International Civil Aviation 
Organization’s (ICAO) recommendation that aircraft weight-based rather than per 
passenger charges be used for infrastructure financing. IATA, however, disagrees with 
ICAO on this point, advocating per passenger charges. This viewpoint is understandable, 
as IATA is an airline industry association. Czerny and Zhang (2015) and Czerny et al. 
(2016) both suggest that per passenger charges are generally less preferred from the 
welfare point of view as compared to the aircraft weight based fees. 
                                                 
5  See http://www.faa.gov/airports/aip/grant_histories/airport_projects/ for more information. 
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2.2 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
Our study deals with the funds appropriated to the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) for the airport infrastructure projects under the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009.  The Act was signed into law by President Barack Obama on 
February 17, 2009, and was the first major piece of legislation adopted by the 111th US 
Congress.  Passage of the ARRA was preceded – and precipitated – by the worst 
recession in the USA since the Great Depression.6  The economic stimulus bill was one 
of the important items on candidate Obama’s election agenda.  Passage of ARRA was in 
part facilitated by fact that in November 2008 election Democratic Party gained control 
of both Houses of the US Congress.  The economic stimulus provided by the ARRA 
totaled $787 billion, roughly evenly split between the tax cuts; education, healthcare and 
other entitlement programs; and the federal contracts, grants and loans7.  Our study 
examines a small portion of funds falling into the latter category – almost $1.1 billion 
made available to the FAA for Grants in-aid for airports. 
 According to the FAA, for the ARRA projects the agency raised its NPR 
threshold from the usual 40-42 to 62, emphasizing the need to cover the entire country 
and putting a somewhat higher priority on the renovation or replacement of the aging 
terminal infrastructure at the smaller airports. At the same time, the agency did reserve 
the right to fund the lower ranked projects “on a case-by-case basis so long as they are 
justified in writing to the satisfaction of the FAA”. Further, the agency indicated it would 
give preference to projects which could be completed within two years. Projects planned 
for AIP spending in the next fiscal year have been excluded from the ARRA funding.  In 
the Guidance document issued by the FAA in relation to the ARRA funds, the agency 
stated that the number of potential projects meeting basic requirements for funding 
exceeded the available funds. 
                                                 
6  According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, recession lasted from December of 
2007 till July of 2009.  In the course of the recession, unemployment rate in the US exceeded 10 percent for 
the first time in over twenty years. 
7  Detailed information is available on the web-site www.recovery.gov established by the US 
Government and dedicated to ARRA. 
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3. Data 
For our analysis, we combine data on various operating characteristics for the population 
of over 2000 public access airports; information on Stimulus grants appropriated to the 
airports; election results along with information on the composition of the Senate; as well 
as the relevant demographic variables. 
 As of September 30, 2009 (the cutoff date for the data used in our analysis), the 
FAA appropriated $1.04 billion of the ARRA funds among over 300 projects.  The 
project-level data has been obtained from the FAA web-site.  Each entry in the dataset 
includes information about the location of the project; project number and description of 
the grant; total grant amount; project’s NPR; and the corresponding Congressional 
District number. We have aggregated this data by the unique project number.  This 
resulted in 309 projects, covering 274 locations.  Of those projects, 275 could be linked to 
235 existing airports located in 191 (out of 435) different Congressional Districts across 
all fifty states.  The focus of our study will be on these very projects.  Table 1 below 
reports the descriptive statistics of the ARRA projects in our dataset. 
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of ARRA airport projects 
 Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
ARRA grant total $3,363,704 $3,360,659 $94,775 $15,000,000 
Runway construction or rehabilitation 
grants 
0.336 0.473 0 1 
Taxiway construction or rehabilitation 
grants 
0.183 0.388 0 1 
Terminal construction or expansion grants 0.055 0.228 0 1 
Apron rehabilitation grants 0.110 0.313 0 1 
Project NPR 65.71 13.06 31 98 
Source: Calculated based on information obtained from FAA 
 
A striking fact from the above table is the low average value of the project NPR.  We 
indicated above that the FAA claimed to have set the NPR threshold at 62 out of 100 for 
ARRA grants; reserving the right to approve projects below this lower limit.  It appears 
from our dataset that the agency has used this discretion quite a bit: 65 projects (21 
percent of the total) in our dataset have NPR below 62; eighteen projects had NPR below 
40, which is the cut-off for the regular AIP program (however, of AIP projects funded 
over 2005-2009, about fourteen percent had NPR below 40).  Note that we only observe 
approved projects, so that we do not observe NPR of projects that were not approved for 
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funding. This unfortunately does not allow us to conduct the kind of analysis McFadden 
(1976) implemented. 
 The airport-level data (also obtained from FAA) include area occupied by the 
airport; number and average length of the runways; and the total number of operations at 
the airport (including commercial, general aviation, military and other flights) in 2009.  
We also have included the data on AIP grants received by the airport over the last five 
fiscal years.  These statistics are available for up to 2046 public access airports. 
 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the airport-level variables.  We present 
these data for both the entire sample of airports, and the ARRA grant recipients. 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics for the airport-level variables 
 
Entire sample ARRA grant recipients 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Airport land area, acres 726.56 1,379.93 1,890.52 2,995.14 
Number of runways 1.686 0.913 2.357 1.323 
Average runway length, feet 4,766.97 1,714.56 6,126.62 1,939.19 
Total operations 40,870.50 70,570.19 98,065.55 133,155.10 
Average operations per runway 21,901.68 26,949.56 36,199.02 31,877.95 
Total AIP grants, 2005-2009 $14,585,454 $98,279,354 $44,964,023 $81,820,192 
Number of airports 2046 235 
Source: FAA 
 
We can see from Table 2 that the airports selected to receive ARRA grants are larger than 
average, by all parameters. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the FAA did 
not live up to its declared emphasis on smaller airports.  The population of public access 
airports includes many small airfields, and “smaller” by the FAA definition for the 
purposes of the ARRA grants might simply mean smaller commercial airports. 
 Demographics data is crucial for the following reason. One way we might observe 
the correlation between election results which brought a Democratic candidate to The 
White House and the amount of funds allocated to the airports is that both airports and 
the Democratic Party electorate might be located in urban areas. As measures of the area 
demographics, we use the latest available numbers for the county level population, 
congressional district level per capita income, and State level population. State level 
population is used to account for the potential disproportionate impact of smaller States 
on allocation of Federal funds. 
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 District level results of the November 2008 US House of Representatives election 
have been obtained from the web-site of the House of Representatives. The district-level 
data for the November 2008 presidential elections have been compiled by Swing State 
Project (www.swingstateproject.com)8 – an online publication devoted to political 
analysis.  The issues in using the raw district level data are as follows.  First, density of 
the congressional districts is proportional to the population density.  Second, large 
airports are usually located in the metropolitan areas with multiple districts.  This means 
that investment into the metropolitan area airports may spill over beyond the 
congressional districts in which those airports are located. We have therefore identified 
the congressional districts adjacent to every district in our dataset; and will in some 
specifications average the election results across the given and all the adjacent districts. 
 Accounting for the impact of the Senate is a tricky thing to do, as Senators are 
elected for six-year terms, and only a third of the Senate is up for reelection every other 
year.  We have therefore recorded, for each State, results of the latest Senate election.  All 
the States were thus covered by 2008 and 2006 elections results.  To account for any 
potential impact of the Senate composition on the grant allocation, we created indicator 
variables for States where both Senators represented either the Democratic or the 
Republican Party. Additionally, we will later present results of analysis of data, 
aggregated at the State level, to better account for the fact that Senate members’ 
constituencies are the US States. Descriptive statistics for some of the political and 
control variables are presented in Table 3 below. 
                                                 
8  These data can be obtained from other sources – for instance, CNN web-site.  However, Swing 
State Project presented this information in easily accessible form. 
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics for Political and Control Variables 
 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Percentage difference between 
democratic and republican votes in 
House election 
13.74 14.27 -100.0 100.0 
Percentage difference between 
democratic and republican votes in 
2008 Presidential election 
8.78 29.56 -54.00 90.00 
Percentage difference between 
democratic and republican votes in 
Senate election 
5.23 29.27 -87.53 79.53 
Congressional district per capita 
income 
$43,598 $11,281 $19,311 $92,181 
County population 142,593 420,300 117 9,862,049 
State population 6,019,636 6,780,646 544,270 36,961,664 
 
4. Data analysis 
4.1 Hypotheses and methodology 
The literature suggests three possible sources of political influence: the White House 
(President), the US Senate, and the Congressional Committees.  We hypothesize that the 
impact of the White House should be the strongest in this particular case. As for the 
hypotheses related to the impact of the White House, we can suppose that ARRA grants 
might have been used to reward districts which showed support to Obama, as evidenced 
by the election results. Thus, our first contention is: 
 Larger Obama-McCain vote differential in the 2008 Presidential election will be 
associated with higher level of funds appropriated to airports located in a 
corresponding district. 
An alternative explanation – grants could be used to sway voters in the districts where 
support for Obama was not sufficiently strong – is less plausible, as the grants have been 
appropriated after the election. 
 A priori, we can expect results of the US House of Representatives election to 
have less of an effect on grant appropriations.  At the same time, we can also suppose that 
the ARRA grants are more likely to be used as an instrument to sway the voters in this 
case (see also Levitt and Snyder, 1997). Therefore, in addition to the percentage 
difference in votes, we will use dummy variable for districts in which the Democratic 
candidate lost the House election. The second hypothesis is thus the following: 
 11 
 
 Larger Democratic-Republican candidate vote differential in the House election 
will be associated with higher level of funds appropriated to airports located in a 
corresponding district. 
To evaluate the extent of the committee power, we have identified congressional districts 
represented by the members of the US House of Representatives Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure, and created the corresponding indicator variable. The 
corresponding hypothesis is: 
 Membership in the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee will be 
associated with higher level of funds appropriated to airports located in a 
corresponding district. 
To account for the possible impact of the US Senate, we will include percentage 
difference in votes received by the Democratic and the Republican Party contenders at 
the last Senate election held in a given State.  Senate composition variables (dummies for 
States with both Senators represented by either political Party) are also used in some 
specifications. The corresponding hypotheses are: 
 Larger Democratic-Republican candidate vote differential in the latest Senate 
election will be associated with higher level of funds appropriated to airports 
located in a corresponding state. 
 Presence of a Senator from the Democratic Party will be associated with higher 
level of funds appropriated to airports located in a corresponding state. 
We will analyze the data in the following ways.  First, since many airports in our dataset 
did not receive the ARRA grants; censored normal regression (also known as Tobit) 
estimation is appropriate.  Airports that did not receive any grants either did not apply or 
had their applications turned down. We can thus make an argument for existence of a 
latent variable behind the ARRA grant amount data.  
Total amount of ARRA grant(s) received by the airport (in millions of dollars) 
will be the dependent variable; and Huber-White standard errors will be reported. To 
assess effect of political variables on the likelihood of an airport receiving an ARRA 
grant, we will estimate the probit model, with the corresponding indicator as the 
dependent variable.  Next, we will perform analysis of the project-level data to evaluate 
whether any political effects we might have captured could be explained by the project-
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specific heterogeneity. Finally, we will aggregate the data to the state level to evaluate the 
impact of the political factors at the amount of ARRA funds received by all the airports 
located in a given state. State rather than congressional district represent the relevant 
constituency for the Senators. We will use state-level population, total operations in all 
airports located in a state, as well as total operations in all airports receiving ARRA funds 
as control variables in the state level regressions. Note that state level regressions only 
include results from the Presidential elections. In fact, including Senate and House 
election results weakens the fit to the data (in terms of adjusted R-squared) without 
impacting other variables significantly. 
 Before we continue, it pays to discuss the expected signs of the coefficients on the 
control variables. Despite the FAA’s stated emphasis on smaller airports; both intuition 
and descriptive statistics suggest that variables measuring the airport size will likely have 
positive effect on the amount of the grant received, as otherwise equal projects will be 
costlier to implement in larger airports. We do not, however, have a prior expectation for 
the effect of the number of operations per runway. On one hand, this is yet another 
indicator of airport size, suggesting a positive sign. On the other hand, busier airports 
may also have more funds available to them via other sources (AIP grants and PFC 
funds). Expected impact of the total AIP grants volume is also ambiguous: larger airports 
receive more AIP grants, but previous AIP funding may indicate less need for 
infrastructure investment under the ARRA program. State population is expected to have 
a negative sign in airport-level regressions, due to disproportionate impact of less 
populous states in US politics. The state-level regressions include, as a measure of extent 
of aviation-related infrastructure, total operations at all the airports within the state. This 
variable is expected to have positive effect on the total amount of ARRA grants received 
by the airports within a state. 
 
4.2 Results and discussion 
The following five tables present results of our data analysis.  Table 4 reports the Tobit 
model results for several specifications. The differences across specifications we employ 
are in the variables related to the House of Representatives – we do this as a conventional 
sensitivity check of our results. Results for the probit model are in Table 5. Table 6 
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includes results for the specifications taking into account election results in the adjacent 
districts.  Table 7 reports results of the project-level data analysis. Results for the state 
level data analysis are reported in Table 8. 
[Insert Tables 4 through 8 here] 
Based on those tables, we can make the following general conclusions about the 
supposed impact of political factors on allocation of ARRA airport infrastructure grants.  
First, results of the presidential election appear to affect the amounts of grants, but do not 
have an impact on whether the airport receives the grant.  Second, controlling for the 
State level composition of the Senate, we detect seemingly counter-intuitive evidence for 
impact of the Senate on the grant allocation process. Namely, airports located in the states 
carried by a Republican at the latest Senate election show higher likelihood of obtaining 
the grant; the amounts involved are also higher.  At the same time, airports located in the 
states represented by two Democratic Party senators are also more likely to obtain the 
grants, other things equal – an expected result. State level regression results demonstrate 
that, controlling for the size of the state’s airport infrastructure, states represented by two 
Republican senators received the least ARRA money. Interestingly, it appears that most 
funds go to the states represented by one Democratic and one Republican senator. Third, 
airport-level and project-level regressions do not produce strong evidence of impact of 
the House of Representatives election results or membership in Transportation and 
Infrastructure Committee. At the same time, House representative from a state sitting on 
the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee does positively impact the total amount 
of ARRA funds going to that state.  Let us examine these statements in more detail. 
 Conclusion about impact of the White House on the grant allocation process 
stems primarily from the Tobit regression results. These show positive association 
between the district level Presidential election results and the amount of funds allocated 
to the airport. We have suggested that such association is consistent with rewarding 
districts for their contribution to the election outcome. Note we have checked for the 
existence of separate effects for the districts in which Obama won, or districts with small 
Obama-McCain vote differential, and did not find any. The association between the 
airport infrastructure grants and the Presidential election results does break down once we 
factor in adjacent districts, or look at the state level data; however, such a result does not 
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necessarily weaken our conclusion, but demonstrates rewards have been targeted to the 
specific districts. 
 Impact of the Presidential election results shows more robustly in Tobit than in 
probit regressions. Our results indicate that Presidential election had impact on the 
amount of grants received by the airport rather than the likelihood of an airport receiving 
the money. Specifically, the Tobit model suggests that, conditional on the airport 
receiving an ARRA grant, a 10 unit increase in the Obama-McCain vote percentage 
difference would lead to $270,000 – 370,000 increase in the amount of ARRA grant 
received by the airport (note that, conditional on the dependent variable being positive, 
Tobit measures a linear relationship). 
The relationships between the presidential election vote differentials and the 
ARRA airport grants appropriations, reported in Tables 4 and 5 do break down once we 
account for the adjacent districts. At the same time, we cannot necessarily state that there 
is no relationship because it did not survive this check. We have here looked at adjacent 
districts for the entire country (i.e., both urban and rural areas). While we generally can 
expect adjacent districts to matter more in urban areas; focusing only on urban area 
airports would require constructing the relevant sub-sample in a somewhat arbitrary way. 
Note also that in the project level regressions the result is quite the opposite – accounting 
for adjacent districts, we gain statistical significance for the Obama-McCain vote 
differential variable. 
 As for the variables measuring role of Senate in the appropriations process, we 
detect the following.  First, impact of Senate election results only shows where we also 
control for the State level composition of the Senate.  Second, we observe association of 
the Senate election results with both the likelihood of the airport receiving a grant, and 
the amount of the money involved. Third, unlike with the presidential election results; 
both likelihood of receiving a grant and the amount involved are larger the higher the 
share of votes received by the Republican Party candidate relative to his/her Democratic 
Party opponent in the latest Senate race. Note that this effect (see Table 4) is about half 
the size of the impact of presidential election results.  A result that is more expected is 
that, other things equal, an airport located in a state represented by two Democratic Party 
Senators is more likely to receive an ARRA grant. Further, state level results clearly 
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show that states represented by at least one Democratic senator received more ARRA 
funds as compared to those represented by two Republican senators, other things equal. 
 Our data analysis failed to detect any impact of the House of Representatives 
election results on allocation of funds in question.  At the same time, there is rather robust 
evidence of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee impact on how much 
money goes to the States. Table 8 shows that states with at least one representative sitting 
on the said Committee received at least 20 percent more funds, other things equal.  
 Overall, our results can be considered consistent with the political factors having 
played a role in ARRA airport grant appropriations.  It also appears that the White House 
and the Senate have been more important players in the process than the House of 
Representatives.  At the same time, our results do not suggest that the House did not have 
a role in distribution of hundreds of billions of federal grants under ARRA.  Recall that 
our study deals with only $1.1 billion of funds in what is a $787 billion economic 
stimulus package. 
 Looking at our results for the control variables, we can say the following. First, 
airport’s total operations, runway length, and number of operations per runway affect 
both the likelihood and the size of the grant in the expected fashion. Larger airports are 
more likely to receive grants, and they receive larger grants. However, busier airports, 
other things equal, receive less money and are less likely to receive it. As we indicated, 
the latter relationship could be driven by the fact that busier airports have other sources of 
funding available to them. Airports that received more AIP grants over the preceding five 
years are also more likely to receive larger ARRA grants. This result was not exactly as 
expected, and we do not have a very good explanation for it now (except maybe for the 
suggestion that this variable could work as another proxy for the airport size). Next, state 
population has an expected effect on both the likelihood and the size of grants, reflecting 
on the disproportionate impact of smaller states in the US political system. While per 
capita income does not have a significant effect on either the grant size or the likelihood 
of an airport receiving the grant; negative signs of most of the coefficients are actually 
intuitive. Higher per capita income means higher demand for air travel, potentially 
translating into both higher Passenger Facilities Charges and higher likelihood of 
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attracting financing on the capital market through bonds. That is, airports in more 
prosperous areas, other things equal, have less of a need for AIP grants. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This study offers the first look at the issue of the impact of political factors on the 
distribution of federal funds for the transportation related infrastructure investment in the 
USA.  We take advantage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 
2009 (more broadly known as the Stimulus) to examine whether political factors played 
any role in allocation of the $1.1 billion worth of Airport Improvement Program (AIP) 
grants included into the package.  The Stimulus provides an excellent case for studying 
the political economy of airport investment, at least as far as the Federal involvement is 
concerned.  The law was set up rather hastily – Barack Obama was elected President in 
November of 2008, and ARRA became law on February 17, 2009; and the criteria for the 
airport infrastructure projects to be funded under AIP as part of ARRA were rather 
vague.  We can therefore suspect that the airport infrastructure grants could be used by 
the Administration or the Congress as a mechanism to reward districts which brought 
more votes in the latest election.  The data structure allows easy matching of the airport 
characteristics, ARRA grant details, and election outcomes at the congressional district 
level. 
 Moreover, study of aviation related infrastructure offers an attractive environment 
for examining the more general issue of political factors behind the allocation of federal 
funds.  Airports and airfields are ubiquitous, unlike, for instance, tornadoes or corn fields.  
Also, airports are generally viewed favorably by the public, unlike some other kinds of 
federally provided infrastructure (e.g., prisons). 
 For this study, we make use of information on the airport infrastructure grants, 
appropriated under the ARRA of 2009. We supplement this data with airport 
characteristics, simple demographic measures, congressional district level results of 
November 2008 election (both Presidential and House), and Senate election results. 
 Data analysis suggests the following general conclusions about the supposed 
impact of political factors on allocation of ARRA airport infrastructure grants.  First, 
results of the presidential election appear to affect the amounts of grants, but do not have 
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an impact on whether the airport receives the grant.  Second, controlling for the State 
level composition of the Senate, we find that airports located in the States carried by a 
Republican at the latest Senate election show higher likelihood of obtaining the grant; the 
amounts involved are also higher. At the same time, airports located in States represented 
by at least one Democratic Party senator are also more likely to obtain the grants, other 
things equal. Third, states with House representatives sitting in the Transportation and 
Infrastructure Committee received substantially more ARRA funds, controlling for the 
size of the aviation related infrastructure. 
 Throughout the world, regulators have been reconsidering the role of the airports.  
Also, our understanding of the determinants of public infrastructure investment, and 
especially of the role of political factors, is far from complete.  This study is one of the 
first attempts at looking into both issues together.  We find that political factors matter.  
The next issue to be addressed – and the one which will require a more thorough 
investigation of these political factors – is what our results imply for such important 
public policy issues as airport regulation, privatization, and congestion. 
 Our study does have several important limitations. Most importantly, we only 
observe successful grants. We do not observe airports which applied for AIP grants under 
ARRA, but did not receive them. Thus, we cannot distinguish between unsuccessful 
bidders and airports that decided not to apply. This is unfortunate, as our analysis would 
be more insightful were we able to account for these potential sample selection biases. 
Second, as airports in the USA are mostly run as public enterprises owned and operated 
by local authorities; politics at the local level could play a role. Identifying the exact level 
of local politics that plays a role would be very difficult, however, as some airports are 
run by cities, others – by counties, and some – by airport authorities set up by multiple 
jurisdictions (such as the New York New Jersey Port Authority). Last but not least, our 
analysis is effectively based on the assumption that this appropriation was a stand-alone 
event, detached from the complex repeated game of Washington politics. While the 
extraordinary nature of the ARRA and the Great Recession provides a defense of this 
point of view; we have to acknowledge that this study heavily hinges on it. 
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Table 4 Airport level Tobit results 
 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
Constant 
-58.098** 
(18.545) 
-55.641** 
(18.412) 
-53.925** 
(18.666) 
-51.873** 
(18.520) 
Logarithm of airport’s area 
0.2641 
(0.4284) 
0.2708 
(0.4262) 
0.2347 
(0.4324) 
0.2434 
(0.4304) 
Logarithm of total operations 
3.0555** 
(0.9025) 
3.0011** 
(0.8997) 
3.1249** 
(0.9102) 
3.0745** 
(0.9073) 
Logarithm of average runway length 
3.7463** 
(1.3991) 
3.7099** 
(1.3990) 
3.8613** 
(1.4045) 
3.8239** 
(1.4031) 
Logarithm of operations per runway 
-2.6830** 
(0.8413) 
-2.6109** 
(0.8355) 
-2.7347** 
(0.8474) 
-2.6673** 
(0.8417) 
Percentage difference between 
democratic and republican votes in 
House election 
0.2735 
(0.6977) 
--- 
0.1861 
(0.7029) 
--- 
Dummy for districts lost by 
Democratic party in House election 
--- 
0.2976 
(0.5880) 
--- 
0.3524 
(0.5959) 
District House representative is a 
member of Transportation and 
Infrastructure Committee 
-0.2906 
(0.6374) 
-0.2591 
(0.6432) 
-0.3702 
(0.6395) 
-0.3328 
(0.6452) 
Percentage difference between 
democratic and republican votes in 
2008 Presidential election 
0.0304** 
(0.0139) 
0.0372** 
(0.0144) 
0.0271** 
(0.0147) 
0.0337** 
(0.0153) 
Percentage difference between 
democratic and republican votes in 
Senate election 
-0.0083 
(0.0080) 
-0.0084 
(0.0080) 
-0.0181* 
(0.0100) 
-0.0182* 
(0.0100) 
Both state senators are democrats --- --- 
1.0960 
(0.7356) 
1.1448 
(0.7325) 
Both state senators are republicans --- --- 
0.0649 
(0.7827) 
0.1320 
(0.7815) 
Logarithm of total AIP grants over 
2005-2009 
0.9901** 
(0.4382) 
0.9852** 
(0.4383) 
0.9685** 
(0.4346) 
0.9622** 
(0.4346) 
Logarithm of congressional district 
per capita income 
0.2426 
(1.4155) 
0.0410 
(1.4094) 
-0.2421 
(1.4403) 
-0.4137 
(1.4340) 
Logarithm of county population 
0.3675 
(0.2688) 
0.3631 
(0.2679) 
0.4206 
(0.2719) 
0.4137 
(0.2706) 
Logarithm of state population 
-0.6366** 
(0.2978) 
-0.6488** 
(0.2970) 
-0.6899** 
(0.3063) 
-0.6979** 
(0.3053) 
Notes: 
1. Dependent variable is total amount of ARRA grant(s) received by an airport (in millions of 
dollars). 
2. Huber – White standard errors in parentheses. 
3. Specifications that do not include logarithm of State population include State dummy variables. 
4. Number of observations – 1937. 
5. Significance: * - 10%; ** - 5%. 
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Table 5 Airport level probit results 
 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
Constant 
-7.2085** 
(3.1403) 
-6.9593** 
(3.1309) 
-6.3257** 
(3.1953) 
-6.1365** 
(3.1850) 
Logarithm of airport’s area 
0.0537 
(0.0699) 
0.0543 
(0.0699) 
0.0480 
(0.0708) 
0.0486 
(0.0708) 
Logarithm of total operations 
0.3852** 
(0.1402) 
0.3805** 
(0.1402) 
0.3989** 
(0.1418) 
0.3949** 
(0.1419) 
Logarithm of average runway length 
0.4675** 
(0.2332) 
0.4642** 
(0.2335) 
0.4909** 
(0.2332) 
0.4883** 
(0.2335) 
Logarithm of operations per runway 
-0.2681** 
(0.1317) 
-0.2618** 
(0.1317) 
-0.2780** 
(0.1328) 
-0.2727** 
(0.1328) 
Percentage difference between 
democratic and republican votes in 
House election 
0.0411 
(0.1216) 
--- 
0.0233 
(0.1220) 
--- 
Dummy for districts lost by 
Democratic party in House election 
--- 
0.0124 
(0.1005) 
--- 
0.0232 
(0.1021) 
District House representative is a 
member of Transportation and 
Infrastructure Committee 
-0.0528 
(0.1060) 
-0.0517 
(0.1071) 
-0.0692 
(0.1066) 
-0.0668 
(0.1077) 
Percentage difference between 
democratic and republican votes in 
2008 Presidential election 
0.0038* 
(0.0022) 
0.0044** 
(0.0022) 
0.0031 
(0.0024) 
0.0037 
(0.0025) 
Percentage difference between 
democratic and republican votes in 
Senate election 
-0.0020 
(0.0014) 
-0.0020 
(0.0014) 
-0.0039** 
(0.0017) 
-0.0039** 
(0.0017) 
Both state senators are democrats --- --- 
0.2138* 
(0.1207) 
0.2185* 
(0.1204) 
Both state senators are republicans --- --- 
0.0045 
(0.1289) 
0.0100 
(0.1291) 
Logarithm of total AIP grants over 
2005-2009 
0.1591** 
(0.0741) 
0.1587** 
(0.0740) 
0.1548** 
(0.0733) 
0.1543** 
(0.0732) 
Logarithm of congressional district 
per capita income 
-0.0767 
(0.2427) 
-0.0967 
(0.2436) 
-0.1771 
(0.2495) 
-0.1931 
(0.2503) 
Logarithm of county population 
0.0343 
(0.0432) 
0.0340 
(0.0431) 
0.0448 
(0.0433) 
0.0444 
(0.0433) 
Logarithm of state population 
-0.1047** 
(0.0495) 
-0.1060** 
(0.0492) 
-0.1162** 
(0.0499) 
-0.1170** 
(0.0496) 
McFadden R-squared 0.2005 0.2005 0.2029 0.2029 
Notes: 
1. Dependent variable is the indicator variable for whether an airport received ARRA grant(s). 
2. Huber – White standard errors in parentheses. 
3. Number of observations – 1937. 
4. Significance: * - 10%; ** - 5%. 
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Table 6 Airport level results, accounting for adjacent districts 
 Probit Tobit 
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
Constant 
-6.5124** 
(3.3404) 
-6.0860* 
(3.3635) 
-45.635** 
(19.638) 
-43.877** 
(19.714) 
Logarithm of airport’s area 
0.0407 
(0.0708) 
0.0332 
(0.0721) 
0.1781 
(0.4353) 
0.1436 
(0.4410) 
Logarithm of total operations 
0.4086** 
(0.1405) 
0.4229** 
(0.1428) 
3.2343** 
(0.9086) 
3.3038** 
(0.9185) 
Logarithm of average runway length 
0.4768** 
(0.2354) 
0.5019** 
(0.2362) 
3.9252** 
(1.4158) 
4.0401** 
(1.4239) 
Logarithm of operations per runway 
-0.2905** 
(0.1328) 
-0.2999** 
(0.1343) 
-2.8449** 
(0.8470) 
-2.8951** 
(0.8551) 
Percentage difference between 
democratic and republican votes in 
House election 
-3.60E-05 
(0.0027) 
8.41E-05 
(0.0028) 
0.0031 
(0.0159) 
0.0034 
(0.0165) 
District House representative is a 
member of Transportation and 
Infrastructure Committee 
-0.0617 
(0.1063) 
-0.0717 
(0.1069) 
-0.4306 
(0.6411) 
-0.4788 
(0.6442) 
Percentage difference between 
democratic and republican votes in 
Presidential election 
0.0026 
(0.0041) 
-1.23E-05 
(0.0045) 
0.0383 
(0.0256) 
0.0275 
(0.0276) 
Percentage difference between 
democratic and republican votes in 
Senate election 
-0.0016 
(0.0015) 
-0.0041** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0082 
(0.0083) 
-0.0195** 
(0.0102) 
Both state senators are democrats --- 
0.2451** 
(0.1215) 
--- 
1.1528 
(0.7331) 
Both state senators are republicans --- 
-0.0484 
(0.1281) 
--- 
-0.1315 
(0.7836) 
Logarithm of total AIP grants over 
2005-2009 
0.1625** 
(0.0748) 
0.1576** 
(0.0737) 
1.0038** 
(0.4426) 
0.9812** 
(0.4385) 
Logarithm of congressional district 
per capita income 
-0.1556 
(0.2646) 
-0.2184 
(0.2660) 
-1.0152 
(1.5532) 
-1.2894 
(1.5575) 
Logarithm of county population 
0.0495 
(0.0432) 
0.0648 
(0.0432) 
0.4246 
(0.2684) 
0.4928* 
(0.2716) 
Logarithm of state population 
-0.1118** 
(0.0510) 
-0.1235** 
(0.0510) 
-0.7176** 
(0.3095) 
-0.7671** 
(0.3139) 
McFadden R-squared 0.1973 0.2009 --- --- 
Notes: 
1. Dependent variable is total amount of ARRA grant(s) received by an airport (in millions of 
dollars) in Tobit; dummy variable for whether an airport received ARRA grant(s) in probit. 
2. Measures of percentage differences of election results are un-weighted averages for the current 
and all immediately adjacent districts. 
3. Huber – White standard errors in parentheses. 
4. Number of observations – 1937. 
5. Significance: * - 10%; ** - 5%. 
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Table 7 Project level regression results 
 Current district With adjacent districts 
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
Constant 
3.4274 
(3.6387) 
4.1714 
(3.6848) 
8.6580** 
(3.8515) 
9.2734** 
(4.0339) 
Logarithm of airport’s area 
-0.0721 
(0.1031) 
-0.0736 
(0.0976) 
-0.0726 
(0.0960) 
-0.0618 
(0.0906) 
Logarithm of total operations 
0.3223* 
(0.1869) 
0.3174* 
(0.1785) 
0.3090* 
(0.1820) 
0.2846* 
(0.1701) 
Logarithm of average runway length 
0.8789** 
(0.3317) 
0.8368** 
(0.3281) 
0.8943** 
(0.3122) 
0.8172** 
(0.3102) 
Logarithm of operations per runway 
-0.3022 
(0.1898) 
-0.2755 
(0.1834) 
-0.2972* 
(0.1843) 
-0.2417 
(0.1739) 
Percentage difference between 
democratic and republican votes in 
House election 
-0.0002 
(0.0019) 
-0.0003 
(0.0019) 
-0.0053 
(0.0047) 
-0.0012 
(0.0016) 
District House representative is a 
member of Transportation and 
Infrastructure Committee 
0.0050 
(0.1511) 
-0.0527 
(0.1462) 
-0.0137 
(0.1465) 
-0.0698 
(0.1406) 
Percentage difference between 
democratic and republican votes in 
Presidential election 
0.0046 
(0.0035) 
0.0029 
(0.0033) 
0.0186** 
(0.0071) 
0.0132** 
(0.0049) 
Percentage difference between 
democratic and republican votes in 
Senate election 
-0.0003 
(0.0027) 
-0.0001 
(0.0023) 
-2.27E-05 
(0.0027) 
-0.0003 
(0.0023) 
Both state senators are democrats 
0.0169 
(0.1901) 
-0.0297 
(0.1848) 
-0.0079 
(0.1929) 
-0.0768 
(0.1882) 
Both state senators are republicans 
0.0412 
(0.1847) 
0.0065 
(0.1729) 
0.1595 
(0.1807) 
0.0816 
(0.1638) 
Logarithm of total AIP grants over 
2005-2009 
0.0734 
(0.0722) 
0.1115 
(0.0715) 
0.0805 
(0.0685) 
0.1157* 
(0.0695) 
Logarithm of congressional district 
per capita income 
0.2323 
(0.3039) 
0.1505 
(0.3074) 
-0.2053 
(0.2897) 
-0.2617 
(0.3185) 
Logarithm of county population 
0.0878 
(0.0620) 
0.1094* 
(0.0589) 
0.0742 
(0.0622) 
0.0865 
(0.0591) 
Logarithm of state population 
-0.0172 
(0.0716) 
-0.0431 
(0.0684) 
-0.0473 
(0.0730) 
-0.0665 
(0.0678) 
Runway grants --- 
0.6524** 
(0.1354) 
--- 
0.6491** 
(0.1336) 
Taxiway grants --- 
0.1954 
(0.1716) 
--- 
0.2433 
(0.1678) 
Airport terminal grants --- 
0.4794 
(0.4518) 
--- 
0.4801 
(0.4700) 
Apron grants --- 
0.5576** 
(0.1918) 
--- 
0.5663** 
(0.1852) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2255 0.2907 0.2514 0.3037 
Notes: 
1. Dependent variable is logarithm of total amount of ARRA grant. 
2. White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses. 
3. Number of observations – 243. 
4. Significance: * - 10%; ** - 5%. 
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Table 8 State level regression results 
Regressor Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 
Constant 
7.2196** 
(1.4748) 
8.3124** 
(1.1317) 
7.6417** 
(1.2749) 
Logarithm of total airport 
operations, state level 
0.4561** 
(0.1604) 
--- 
0.1677 
(0.1302) 
Logarithm of total operations in 
ARRA airports, state level 
--- 
0.5807** 
(0.1173) 
0.5097** 
(0.1215) 
Logarithm of state population 
0.2022 
(0.1301) 
0.0700 
(0.1034) 
0.0185 
(0.1129) 
At least one House representative 
is a member of Transportation 
and Infrastructure Committee 
0.3456** 
(0.1447) 
0.2321** 
(0.1073) 
0.2145* 
(0.1064) 
Both Senators are from 
Democratic Party 
-0.3438* 
(0.1884) 
-0.3933** 
(0.1504) 
-0.3885** 
(0.1548) 
Both Senators are from 
Republican Party 
-0.5987** 
(0.2262) 
-0.4976** 
(0.1588) 
-0.4966** 
(0.1600) 
Obama-McCain vote differential 
-0.0062 
(0.0052) 
-0.0081* 
(0.0041) 
-0.0062 
(0.0040) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6100 0.7202 0.7235 
Notes: 
1. Dependent variable is natural logarithm of State level total ARRA airport grants 
2. Airport operations and state population are in logarithmic form. 
3. Number of observations – 50. 
4. Significance: * - 10%; ** - 5%. 
